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The complexity, intricacy, cost and rapid obsolescence of
modem military weapons has produced unprecedented problems in
logistic support. These problems have been attacked in the Navy
from two directions. The first, by efforts to improve "in-house"
logistic support procedures. The second, through increased reliance
on Contractor support systems, particularly in the test and fleet
introductory phases of a weapon's development. This latter course
of action is examined insofar as applied to introductory support of
the McDonnell F4H-1 aircraft at two Pacific Fleet operating sites.
review and report of the initial impact of Contractor
support of the F4H-1 is presented. Suggested improvements are made
for extended use of Navy personnel in the Contractor support program.
*«««« DOWNGRADEDAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
May 1962


















men <, or f ,—
-










the Facility of the Navy Management School
U. 3. Naval Postgraduate School
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Management
by
Paul M. Allen
Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy
*jH-qs document is subject to special export






:' uiidlj i.iay be? , ' .: ' ?a only with"
prior u| ' r . 1 f the U.J. Naval i catgraduate
School—(Codo G3o i .
%«, p.
Library
u.s. naval" postgraduate school
monterey, califori
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
CHAPTER PAGE
I. SCOPE OF THE I I . 1
Past Logistic Support
"In-House Effort to Improve Support 4
Emphasis on the FIRM Plan
Evolvement of Contractor Support 6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT PRO S. 9
Planned Fleet Introduction of the Weapon 9
Responsibilities of Major Participants in
Contractor Support , 10
Contractor Support Sites 16
Summary ..... 16
III. CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF THE F4H-1 IN THE FLEET 18
SAR-398 actions at NAS Kiramar, California. ...... 19
Transition to Kavy Support at Miramar 24
SAR-398 Actions at, Naval Missile Center, Point Kugu . . 28
Other Facets of Contractor Support of the F4H-1 . . . . 29
Summary 31
IV. SUMMARY 33
USAF Policies on Contractor Support 33
Recommendation For Program Cost Analysis 36
Summary, Conclusions, Suggested Improvements. 37

CHAPTER I
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The inadequacies of logistic support of new aircraft and
missiles introduced into Navy fleet units has traditionally been
the subject of many scathing reports and much soul searching. In
In the early life, say the first year, of a weapons system (aircraft
and missiles) our military supply and maintenance performance is at
best marginal. And when, as was the case in 1956 and 1957, several
new aircraft were introduced into the fleet within a short period
of time, logistic support difficulties were chaotic. "Logistic
support" in the sense under discussion, includes supply, maintenance,
engineering, training and technical documentation.
At this point it is considered worthwhile to emphasize the
recognized, but oft overlooked, mutual dependency of supply and
maintenance in the field of aviation weapons support. Because of
the critical function of reparable components of a weapons system,
poor maintenance and repair practices, material failures, design
changes, improper in-flight techniques, and inadequate "know how"
and tooling, all will magnify supply support problems far out of
proportion to their actual responsibility for difficulties encount-
ered. Conversely an inadequate or untimely supply of materials can
delay essential maintenance, thereby aggravating maintenance problems,
Any of these situations of course, ultimately impinge on the ability

of a command to meet operational commitments and weaken our military
readiness posture.
As in almost every field of endeavor, the technical complexity
of modern fleet weapons is increasing at an increasing rate. Here-
in lies the crux of our problem. As weapons, particularly manned
aircraft, are required to fly higher, faster, and further, and to
operate alternately in tropical and frigid environments from sea
level to fifty thousand feet or more, and to do so with the capa-
bility of accurately launching a myriad of complex bombs and rockets,
the Navy finds itself supporting (or trying to support) a weapon
system that hasn't quite been invented yet. \\e really can't afford
to wait for a system to be completely "invented", or operationally
perfected if you will, for if we did, by the time we "debugged"
the majority of our equipments they would be obsolete. Such is the
pace of today's military weapons race.
On the other hand, with the cost of military hardware becoming
astronomical, the United States Navy continues to have ever increas-
ing world-wide commitments that must be met with relatively small
force levels and limited budgets. In 1956 the conservatively esti-
mated fly-away cost of one F3U fighter aircraft was one million eight
hundred thousand dollars! This is a capital investment of more than
twenty five million dollars for just one fighter squadron! Today,
only six years later the cost of a similar squadron of our most re-
cently produced fighter, the F4H, is about thirty five per cent

greater. The Navy, then and now, cannot afford to have such expen-
sive capital investments inoperative for very long periods.
Historically, the percentage of total Aircraft Out of Commission
for Parts (AOCP) by model has been the primary measure of the effect-
iveness and responsiveness of the aviation supply system. Although
the AOCP rate reflects in varying degrees certain factors previous-
ly mentioned which are beyond the control of the supply system,
managers responsible for the support of aviation units still heavily
rely on AOCP statstics as a valuable control and reporting device.
Additional measures of logistic effectiveness which are being more
diligently scrutinized by operations, maintenance and supply personnel
are the percentage of time aircraft are down for maintenance as ex-
2pressed in the squadron's ZUlU reports, and the number of Aircraft
Not Fully Equipped (ANFE) as reported to the Aviation Supply Office
(the Supply Demand Control Point for aviation material) by various
activities supporting Naval aircraft. ANFE percentages indicate the
degree to which aircraft, that may be flyable, are unable to perform
their primary mission. For purposes of this discussion, data on AOCP
percentages were more readily obtainable and will be used with the
1
Commander W.L. Thorpe, Jr., SC, USN, "An appraisal of the
Effectiveness of the Section "B" Allowance List in the Support of
lern Carrier Based Aircraft", 31 October 1958, (Unpublished Pro-
fessional Paper on Supply Management}.





How much has been said about the general subject of inadequa-
cies of logistic support of fleet aviation, j-et's get more specific.
Until 19$6 the peacetime AOCP rate for fleet aircraft fluctuated in
the range of five to ten per cent. This rate, while not condoned,
was perhaps justifiable in the light of the funds and effort needed to
reduce the rate to any marked degree. However, in 1956 with the
introduction of six new sophisticated jet aircraft, the AOCP rates
for some models soared at times to fifty per cent or more and on
3
the average were in the twenty to thirty percent range. hile
higher than normal ACGP rates are to be expected in the initial
phases of introductory fleet operations, the inordinately high rates
continued on these aircraft well in 1958.
In light of the obvious inadequacies of logistics support
rendered to fleet aviation, the "Arnold Board "^ was created in 1957.
This board conducted an extensive and searching study of the support
policies and procedures for Naval Aviation from the Chief of Naval
Operations down through logistic and operating commands to the level
of fleet squadrons. This study resulted in many constructive recom-
mendations and gave impetus to the development of more efficient ways
•of doing business. Two of the programs which received their impetus
Thorpe, Op. Cit., p. 5.
^"Report on the Board convened by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Material) to study and report upon the Adequacy of Naval
.ation Support", March 1958.
L

from the Arnold Board were the Screening for Aeronautical Material
(SAM)'' program and the Revised Aeronautical Support Program (RASP) .
It is emphasized that the author does not consider that the Board
created these programs, but rather, brought considerable pressure to
bear on all levels of command to develop and experiment with imagin-
ative support systems to meet the challenge of technological com-
plexity. Fortunately, this emphasis and pressure did not diminish
with the adjournment of the Board. The after effects are still
evident today, as for example in the mushrooming aviation logistic
support organization of the Bureau of Naval Areapons Fleet Readiness
Representatives. To say the least, the Board discouraged the natural
inclination of many to maintain the status quo in the performance of
logistics support tasks.
As might be expected most recommendations received and acted
upon during this period were toward improvement of Navy "in-house"
logistic operations. Fast turn around of reparables, identification
and more selective management control over the most important supply
items of our inventory, reduction or at least tighter control over
design changes, institution of more responsive mechanized aircraft
Commander Doyle ... Selden, SG, U3N, "Inventory Management by
Exception", 8 June I960 (Professional paper on Supply Management).
°BUASR Instruction 4400.6, Joint 3UA;:r/BUSANDA Program for a
Refined Aeronautical Support Program (RASP), 16 February 1959.

configuration control records, etcetera, all 7,;ere recommended and
adopted in varying degrees.
In another sphere of aviation logistic support related to
Arnold Boj.rd recommendations, the Bureau of Naval (then the
Bureau of Aeronautics ), under the direction of Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, was making a concerted effort in conjunction with the air-
craft industry zo reduce substantially the time required to bring a
weapon from the drawing board to full fleet operating status. This
n
is the Fleet Introduction Replace*] odel (FIRM) Plan. In a
of rapid technological advance and concomitant, rapid obsolescence of
weapons, the advantages accruing from a reduction in the time re-
quired to design, test, develop, evaluate and introduce a weapon are
obvious. Accordingly, all parts of the ere subjected to
intense study with a view to shortening and combining phases where
practicable. At the same time, efforts were directed toward the
optimization of aircraft availability during Contractor-] st
and evaluation phases and during the early stages of aircraft
operation in the fleet environment, i.e. the Fleet Introduc
Program (FIP) or Carrier Replacement Air Grouj (RCVG) training pro-
gram. Other areas requiring improvement under the Alan were
the training of fleet maintenance and operations personnel, engine-
ering and maintenance standards, technical data and services and
?OPNAV Instruction 03700.7, Policy for Aircraft Produced
Fleet Introduction Replacement koJei aircraft
.

material reliability. All of these areas seemed to promise improve-
ment only if contractors were more intimately involved than they had
ever been before in supporting weapons systems at military operating
sites.
th the above in mind, and with primary regard to the logistic
support aspects of the FIRM Plan, the Bureau of Naval Weapons and the
aircraft industry developed the "Contractor Support Program" in
1958. The program was promulgated as a "Contractor Material Support
Document for United States Navy Contracts." Subsequently this doc-
ument with minor conceptual revisions, was superseded and reissued
as "Weapons Requirements," Number Two (WR-2).
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a review of
contractor support with emphasis on the supply aspects and with re-
spect to observed results with the first Navy weapon to be supported
under the Contractor Support Program. This weapon, the F4H-1, is an
all weather fighter-bomber aircraft manufactured for the Navy by the
Donne11 Aircraft Corporation. For purposes of this paper, the
notation SAR 398 will be used to refer to the Contractor Support
Program.
In summary, the intricate and complex weapons of today and to-
-morrow, more than ever, require effective and responsive logistic
"Bureau of Aeronautics Department of the Navy, Special Aero-
nautical Requirements , SAR 398 , 30 September 1958.

support systems. These systems may take the form of innovations or
major changes in the Navy's "in-house" organizational structure,
techniques and procedures. On the other hand, as is argued by in-
dustry, a great deal of logistics functions performed by Service
organizations responsible for procurement and later stages of de-
velopment are strictly management functions that many large indus-
trial firms are uniquely equipped to perform well and that should
9be delegated to them as prime contractors. Somewhere between com-
plete Military support of a weapons system and complete contractor
support there is probably an optimum support relationship. Some of
the possible answers to this moot question will be explored with
regard to the F4H-1 aircraft.
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland M. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age , The Rand Corporation, I960., p. 229,

CHAPTER II
/ELOPMENT OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT PROCEDURES
SAR 398, the Contractor Support Program, as published and im-
plemented in supporting the Fi+K-l, generally prescribed the proced-
ures, terms and conditions governing the selection, funding, receipt,
storage, issue, replenishment and disposition of material necessary
to support a given weapon system during the test period and initial
fleet introduction period. In addition, SAR-398 specified the
terms and conditions governing the furnishing of certain technical
data and services which were to be provided under the contract for
supplies. Services not included under SAR-398 were those incident
to training of fleet personnel in maintenance and operation of the
weapon and those for furnishing of contractor employees to man and
operate the supply support and teclinical assistance programs. Though
intimately related to the performance of the contractor under SAR-398
and within the term "Contractor Support", all these functions are
handled under separate contractual arrangements and will only be
touched on briefly.
I. P.- FLEET INTRODUCTION OF TI:
The contract for development of the FAH-1 was let some seven
Commander H. T. Barnett, SC, USN, "Navy/Contractor Support
Program", a presentation at the 16th Annual Aviation Supply Conference,
26-30 October 1959.

and one half years ago with the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. The
first aircraft flight was in April of 1958. Initial planning called
for introduction of the aircraft into the Carrier Replacement Air
Group (RCVG) VF-121, at Miramar Naval Air Station, California in
July of I960. Because of various slippages and program changes, the
first aircraft did not arrive at Miramar until 28 December i960.
Starting on this date the RCVG introduction program for both the At-
lantic and Pacific Fleets was combined at Miramar for the first four
months of fleet operations under - 198. In April of 196l, the
Atlantic Fleet RCVG F4H training nucleus, VF-101 Detachment Alfa,
split off from the Pacific RCVG and returned with five aircraft to
its permanent duty station, the Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia.
In accordance with its mission, this unit expanded to a full scale
training operation for Atlantic Fleet F4H squadrons.
The first deployment of an F4H squadron overseas is scheduled
to be in the Atlantic Fleet aboard the U.S. 3. FC
.-.L in August
1962. This is some four years after the first flight and about
twenty months after the first fleet deliveries.
II. IBILITIES OF MAJ tTICIPA]
CTOR SUPPORT
The Bureau of Aeronautics was assigned overall responsibility
for coordinating and directing logistic support of FIRM Plan air-




1. The promulgation of planning data covering employment and
deployment plans for the aircraft designated for contractor support.
2. The designation of those aircraft to be supported by the
contractor during various phases of the FIRM Plan, e.g. Replacement
Air Group Training, including specifying bhe length of contractor
support period.
3. To insure that contracts contain the requirements of
398 for contractor support.
A. To provide as required, coverage for contractor assistance
in the field of training in all major elements of the weapon (other
than SAR-398).
5. To specify and administer control over funds charged with
contractor support program costs.
6. Providing certain equipments and materials for contractor
use, e.g. aircraft engines.
7. Promulgate maintenance, repair and overhaul policy for
aircraft and major components during contractor and Navy support
periods
.
8. To arrange for Material Support Planning Conferences with
the objective of establishing target dates for all specific aero-
nautical material support actions, assign primary responsibility
2
for such actions, and resolve any support problems.
2BUAER Instruction NAVAER 00.73B, Logistic Material Support of




The Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, is the Navy Supply
Demand Control Point for Aeronautical Material. This office is re-
sponsible for providing an adequate range and quantity of spare
assemblies, spare parts, special support equipment, and adequate
stocks of general aeronautical materials to support all FIRM Plan
aircraft with the exception of those aircraft and equipments desig-
nated for direct contractor support. This doesnot mean that the
Aviation Supply Office ] is not involved in SAR-398. To the
contrary, it is involved from the earliest planning until the air-
craft is phased out of the Navy. ASO participation and direction
at all stages is extensive for several reasons. Complexity, cost
and administrative considerations, require that there be more than
one prime contractor involved in developing and supplying major
equipments which become an integral part of the aircraft. Conse-
quently, as in the case of the F4H-1, though McDonnell coordinated
supply support though most phases of the FIRM Plan, the source of
some forty two per cent? of the line items of material initially
procured for "contractor" support at fleet training sites, and a
similar percentage at test and evaluation six.es, was procured by
ASO from other prime contractors such as the General Electric
^Minutes of F4H-1/IF SAR 400 Delivery Status Meeting, 1-2
November 1961, Aviation Supply Officer letter WSS1-A, 5050 of 17
November 1961 with enclosure.
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Corporation and provided to McDonnell for their use. Technically
speaking, the two material source categories are called Contractor
Furnished Equipment (CFE), mainly the airframe, special support
equipment therefor and some internal components, and Government
Furnished Aeronautical Equipment (GFAE) such as the propulsion
unit (the J-79 engine), and the fire control radar system.
ASO in order to appropriately emphasize the integrated nature
of support actions needed for modern weapons has established an in-
ternal organization, the Weapons Systems Division.^" This division
manages weapons systems assigned to the ASO in order to assure timely
and complete logistic support for all Navy and Marine aircraft and
their related systems. Specific duties are: the coordination of ASO
logistic actions in support of specific weapons, analyzing and report-
ing status of weapons systems, providing a central point of contact
for weapon systems information on supply iLems, providing planning
data for inventory management purposes, and keeping top management
advised of weapon supply support status/problems. Each weapon, for
example, the FAH-1, is assigned to a Manager team of one officer and
one civilian, both of whom will stay with a weapon for a minimum period
of three years. This team coordinates responsibilities with regard to
contractor support and transition to Navy support that have been assign-
ed to ASO by the Bureau of Aeronautics as follows:
aviation Supply Office, V/eapons Managers Handbook . ASO Internal
Publication of 1 March 19o2
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1. Chair Support Material List conferences and review Support
Material Lists as submitted by the contractor, making arrangements
as necessary to provide spares to contractor support sites on con-
tractor warehouses for Government Furnished Aeronautical Material.
2. .Emphasize and monitor early accumulation, evaluation and
analysis of accurate and complete usage data from contractor and
Navy supported operations. This data to be used in assisting in
adjusting procurement actions.
j> . Issue appropriate detailed supplemental instructions and
guidelines to all concerned regarding allocation, distribution,
handling, accounting, etc., of material procured under the contrac-
tor support concept.
A. Schedule provisioning and delivery of spares to facilitate
transition from contractor support to Navy support.
5. Conduct frequent liaison with all activities involved in
supporting a program.
The contractor was given a great amount of latitude under SAR-
39B in the establishment of internal procedures for supporting the
the weapon during the test and evaluation phases. However, the
. . 5following were his specific responsibilities;
1. Determination of range and quantity of Contractor-Furnished
-'Special Aeronautical Requirements, SAR 398, Op. Cit.
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Equipment, Government-Furnished Aeronautical Equipment, special
support equipment, and general and standard support equipment re-
quired at various support, sites. This is the basis for the Support
Material Lists mentioned above.
2. Operation of central storage facilities at each operating
site, including replenishment and distribution of material.
3. Design of special support equipment as required.
U. Arrangement for rework of Contractor Furnished Equipment
and spares.
5. Provide technical data and publications as required under
the program.
6. Submission for Navy approval of design changes to end
articles and modification of materials in store, in use and in man-
ufacture as approved.
7. Establishment of a Maintenance Support Plan in consonance
with Material Support and Deployment Plans.
8. Training of government personnel as provided for in call
contracts.
Other activities involved in the program are numerous and their
responsibilites need not be set forth here. Commander Naval Air
Force, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, fleet operating and test sites,
overhaul activities, the prime equipment contractors, many subcon-
tractors, Navy technical staffs, etc., all were involved in varying
degrees and at varying time periods in the FIRM Plan. The variations
15

in themselves are not significant to this study. However, it is
quite apparent that coordination of all possible actions was a very
difficult and time consuming task.
III. UPPORT SITES
Under the test, evaluation and fleet training phases of the
FIRM Plan, aircraft were deployed to seven different sites from
Massachusetts, Maryland and Virginia on the east coast, to New
Mexico and three activities in California. All seven of these sites
were supported for varying lengths of time by the contractor under
SAR-398. The focal point of supply action was the McDonnell ware-
house and plant at St. Louis. At each aircraft operating site the
contractor had established civilian maintenance and supply support
teams. Aircraft are still operating at six of these locations.
McDonnell is contractually committed for an indefinite period to
full support at four of these activities where aircraft are still
undergoing test and evaluation. The remaining two sites, the Naval
Air Stations, Miramar and Oceana, are now primarily supported by the
Navy supply system, though the contractor is providing assistance on
a limited scale in expediting material requirements.
IV. SUMMARY
As might be expected on the first contract under SAR-398, there
were many operating plans and logistic support plans and responsibil-
ites that required definition. r/diere possible these plans and re-
16

sponsibilities were spelled out but it was also obvious that there
were many grey areas that could not be cleared up until such time
as experience was gained in day-to-day support. The Bureau of Aero-
nautics, Aviation Supply Office, McDonnell aircraft Corporation,
Fleet Air Commands, and many other military and civilian activities
involved in supporting the F4H-1 needed to be integrated as a team.
This had been done before and would be done again. The difference
in the scheme of things this time was the emphasis on contractor
support and responsibility, where in the past, the Navy had assumed





CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF THE F4H-1 I
have reviewed the contractor support program in light of
general plans and responsibilities. It is now considered appro-
priate to review the program in action at one fleet test site and
to evaluate, after the fact, the results of the program at anot.ier
fleet operating site which was under SAR-398 but now is under Navy
support concepts.
Unfortunately, it appears that no thorough documentation of
the effectiveness of contractor support has been made at any lo-
cation. The author has visited a fleet test and evaluation site
of the F4H-1, the Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, California, and
a fleet training and introduction site for the weapon, the Replace-
ment Carrier Air Group, i/F-121, at the Naval Air Station, Miramar,
California. At neither location did contractor or Navy personnel
have a distinctive measure of effectiveness with regard to contrac-
tor support. Nor does there appear to be an official program of re-
porting and analysis of the worth of the contractor support program*
For the above reasons, this paper must be limited in scope to
a narrative dissertation on the methods known to be practiced and
the effects as observed by participants and as substantiated to the
author. This parochial view may serve to dampen the validity of the
study. On the other hand, the views expressed are considered to be
18

founded, in fact, and where practicable and considered necessary,
are documented though perhaps inferentially.
- 398 CTIONS IA
The early planning for Replacement Carrier Air Group training
called for a fourteen month time span of contractor support commen-
cing at Miramar in August I960 and terminating on 1 October 1961. 1
McDonnell personnel arrived at Miramar in August as scheduled and
set up a base in the RGVG hangar. Provision was made by the station
for storage of material and office space for maintenance, supply and
general administration. However, as indicated previously, the first
aircraft did not arrive until the end of December i960. By this
time McDonnell's total force had built up to about sixty engineering,
supply, maintenance and administrative personnel. Of this total
thirteen were employed in the supply support function.
During the contractor support period the Supply Department of
the Naval air Station was not directly involved in the support of
the FAH-1. However,
-.he Department did act as a receiving and ship-
ping agent for contractor representatives in the RGVG.
LI material identification records maintained by the contrac-
tor used the manufacturer's part numbers. This in itself is a very
mutes of F4H-1/1F SAR AGO Delivery Status Meeting, Op. Sit




important advantage accruing under the contractor support program.
The use of Federal Stock Numbers under a Navy support concept re-
quires extensive cross reference publications over and above man-
ufacturer's documentation and a concomitant high level of research
effort just to identify material requirements. This difficulty in
achieving a common language between the consumer and producer is
high-lighted during the early life of a weapon when design changes
and part number modifications are rampant. Federal Stock Numbers,
to say the least, are unwieldy and are often insignificant so far
as maintenace personnel (consumers) and contractors (producers) are
concerned. In any logistic system good communications and a common
language are very important in expediting action and simplifying
procedures. Therefore, the advantage gained by the contractor in
using part numbers cannot be overlooked.
The guide for stocking of aeronautical material was the Sup-
port Material List mentioned earlier. This list reflected Navy
approved contractor estimates of requirements and was modified by
usage experience during the support period. It was a key document
for it resulted in the allocation of scarce aircraft spare parts
procurement funds to SAR-398, which in turn, reduced the amount of
funds available for the "initial buy" of Navy stocks of the same
material. Accordingly, the items included in the Support Material
List were carefully scrutinized by the Navy (Material Inspection
Service, Bureau of Aeronautics, Aviation Supply Office) to assure
20

optimum range and depth. Particular attention was given to "hi-cost"
items of both Contractor and Government Furnished Equipment. Further
the Bureau of Naval Weapons and its Vest Coast Fleet Readiness Re-
presentatives performed a physical audit of items on the List.
The contractor representatives in replenishing material or in
obtaining technical data or in satisfying requests for material not
stocked, used teletype and telephone communications to the McDonnell
plant in St. Louis. Air transportation and close control over mater-
ial in transit was the rule. Through individual attention to all
line item requirements, contractor representatives estimated that
ninety seven per cent of the material requisitioned from St. Louis
for immedliate use was delivered to kiramar within thirty six hours
after the request was submitted through contractor channels. On the
receiving end of the requests, the McDonnell material support organ-
ization used every practicable means to provide requirements, in-
cluding, in some cases, the removal of parts from aircraft in pro-
duction. The major difficulty experienced in obtaining materials at
the support site was apparently for Government Furnished Aeronautical
Material. The duality of material support sources precluded the con-
tractor from exercising complete control over the replenishment of
backup stocks at his central warehouse in St. Louis.
One of the prime considerations in maintaining an optimum sized
Support Material List is the expeditious repair and return to stock
of reparable items found to be defective and the expeditious turn-
21

around of items requiring modification because of design changes.
On the maintenance side of the picture, it is desirable to develop,
at an early date, a local fleet and shore facility repair and over-,
haul capability, particularly for hi-cost reparables. The existen-
ce of these capabilities minimizes the time required to repair de-
fective items, reduces stock level requirements, and in the case of
fleet units, developsmaintenance experience necessary to obtain self
sufficiency when deployed. Contractor and fleet support experience
at iiiramar indicated that, except for electronics component repair,
it is difficult, if not impractical, to optimize training in fleet
repair capability, and at the same time maintain high aircraft
availability with a relatively small stock level of parts. The
requirements of the latter program emphasize rapid repair and turn
around of reparables, whereas, the repair and overhaul training
program, place emphasis on tooling and time consuming learning pro-
cesses which cannot be accommodated in the heat of maintaining the
aircraft in an "up" status. In this same vein, usage data generated
under contractor support methods appeared to be suspect because of
the inclination and emphasis "to keep 'em flying" through replace-
ment of defective components. Therefore, the usage being generated
was reflecting defective components vice defective parts of these
components. It is worthy of note that contractor local issues at
Kiramar reached a peak of approximately two thousand line items in
the month of September 1961, the last month of operation under SAR-
22

398. Before leaving the subject of local repair it is necessary to
point out that both the contractor and fleet representatives con-
sidered that the "D" level fleet electronics repair capability at
Miramar was eminently successful. "D" level maintenance for elec-
tronics is shop and component repair including servicing, test or
operational check, trouble shooting and adjustment, replacement of
defective parts such as resistors and capacitors, et al. The fact
that much of this work was done for F4H at the station was highly
significant because most of the complexity in this weapon is attri-
butable to electronic sub-systems.
In May of 1961, in consonance with the Maintenance Support
Plan, McDonnell began to rapidly phase out contractor maintenance
personnel and the Navy assumed a concurrent increase in support re-
sponsibility. However, fleet maintenance personnel had been inte-
grated with contractor personnel since the start of the RCVG program.
The contractor actually reduced the total personnel on board from
sixty to twenty over a period of two months. As might be expected,
overall maintenance performance deteriorated during this period but
subsequently recovered, lixperience, or lack of it, and contractor
versus Navy maintenance techniques, undoubtedly contributed the most
to maintenance transition difficulties. However, there were some
discussions as to the disparity between maintenance techniques as
promulgated for Navy use in McDonnell prepared maintenance handbooks
and actual maintenance techniques practiced by contractor represen-
23

tatives under SAR-398. Here again, there is circumstantial evidence
pointing toward the use of exigent procedures in order to maintain
flight schedules.
POSITION TO NAVT SUPPORT AT
s mentioned previously, the Navy Supply Department ar Miramar
did not assume responsibility for support of the weapon until 1
October 1961. However, Navy-wide plans for transition to Navy sup-
port had been jelling for over two years and Miramar support was
very much a part of these plans.
One significant innovation that should be mentioned at this
time, was the establishment of a locally constituted F4H Support
team. This Team was created by Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific
Fleet, primarily to provide emphasis on local procedures with re-
gard to overhaul, repair, maintenance and supply support of the
weapon. The Team was not a duplicate of any team established under
Bureau of Naval 7,'eapons documentation but was developed solely to
coordinate .'est Coast support actions. Some members of the local
team were members of Navy wide teams. From a limited analysis of
the concept, it appeared to be a successful organizational move
which greatly facilitated and improved communications between local
fleet and contractor representatives and their respective supporting
groups outside the local area.
A "Supply Item Provisioning Document, Special Aeronautical
24

Requirements, Number 400 (SAR - 400)", of April 1953, prescribed
the terms and conditions governing the furnishing and selection of
materials and services covering the normal "buy" of Navy Supply
and maintenance requirements. This was the Navy support counter-
part to SAR-393. The Procedural transition from support under one
document t'o support under the other was not too definitive for the
F4H-1 even though the channels for obtaining and providing parts
and equipment were spelled out in detail. Improvements in this
area are being effected for subsequent aircraft models being intro-
2
duced into the fleet. The distinct impression was gained that
transition supply-wise from Contractor to Navy support was not very
smooth at the local level. Rather, it seemed to consist of the
closing of the contractor "store" one day and an opening under "new
management" the next day with practically no indoctrination. This
is considered to be a basic defect and was in marked contrast to
the integration of fleet maintenance personnel into the contractor
support program from the date of arrival of aircraft at the fleet
operating site. The main "reason" for not utilizing fleet supply
personnel in the contractor support program appears to hinge on the
belief that the local Navy supply system is unable to effectively
sub-optimize support of a single weapon. Accordingly, the Navy pays
2Aviation Supply Office Instruction 4000.4, Contractor to Navy
Support Transition Conferences ; procedures for , 2 October 1961
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a premium to private industry to exert this special emphasis. ..hile
it is difficult to document the reasoning behind this philosophy,
practically speaking, it is based on the premises that the sheer
size of the Navy logistic operation, its multiplicity of tasks which
result in a mediocre common denominator of performance, and its
attendant bureaucratic red tape, precludes special emphasis on
support of a single weapon at an operating site. This philosophy
is considered to be mostly conjecture since the Navy never has tried
to provide a complete in-service weapon support concept for an air-
craft down to the operating level. In this regard, it is believed
that supply personnel at the operating site should be as thoroughly
integrated into the support of the weapon from its arrival on board
as are fleet maintenance personnel. To have done so wix-h the F4H-1
would have obviated some of the difficulties of transition, would
have provided valuable experience with regard to peculiarities of
the contractor material support problems and would have established
guidelines for local stocking and replenishment policies for repair
parts. Any such integration of Lavy personnel would of course re-
quire the continued use of informal techniques used by the contractor
including those used for replenishing and expediting material re-
quirements.
At transition time, difficulties encountered by the Navy supply
system were centered around two areas. First, there were many pro-
blems in identifying and cross referencing SAR-398 and SAR-400 stocks
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of material to Federal Stock Numbers, i.e. publications and stock
number changes were not current-. Secondly, there was slippage in
the delivery of 3AR-400 material to Navy sites with the result that
ninety five per cent of the spares, though shipped by the end of
October, arrived at the station in a very short period of time.
Consec;uently, support emphasis suffered while efforts were concen-
trated on assimilation, receipt ^identificati on, storage and record-
ing of assets. Fortunately contractor technical and service re-
presentatives "were available on the scene to render assistance.
In retrospect, the contractor representatives in a nine month
period had supported, in a very specialized and commendable manner,
an average of about twelve aircraft at Miramar. The local Navy
support system assumed responsibility for twenty three F4H-1 air-
craft on 1 October in addition to normal support responsibilities of
more than two hundred fifty other aircraft representing ten different
models. Further, in a period of five months subsequent to the Navy
support date, the number of FAH-1 aircraft at Miramar has increased
to more than forty. During this period the AOGP rate for this air-
craft has ranged from seven to fourteen per cent with the average a
respectable eight per cent. It is also understood Lhat the AOCP
rate for the FAH-l at the Naval Air Station, Oceana, the other fleet
Minutes of FAH-l/lF SAR 400 Delivery Status Meeting, Op., Git.,
Enclosure (5), Page (l).
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site, has under Navy support, been comparable to the rates of other
more stablized first line aircraft.
3AR-398 ACTIONS AT Tl
,
- GU
The Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, California has been
testing and evaluating the F4H since July of I960. In April 1962
a total of six aircraft were actually on board in the custody of
three activities; Air Development Squadron (VX-4), Guided Missile
Unit Seven (GMU-7), and one aircraft on Bailment to the Raytheon
Company. All of these aircraft are early production models, some
of the first twenty six produced, are not configured or soon to be
configured for fleet operation, and are often characterized as
"hand tailored" aircraft.
Maintenance for these aircraft through "C" level (Component
repair) capability is performed by a group of twenty nine enlisted
men under the direction of the Officer in Charge of GMU-7. Tech-
nical assistance is provided by McDonnell representatives and other
vendor representatives involved in various sub-systems such as the
engine and missile systems.
The supply support techniques employed at Point Mugu are the
same as those that were employed under SAR-39& at Miramar. A total
of nine McDonnell employees are involved in the supply management
function for the F4H-1. The major difference between the concepts
at the two locations is that the aircraft at Point Mugu (as well as
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at three other test sites) will remain under SAR-398 indefinitely.
There is a separate Support Material List for Point Mugu, and some
sixteen thousand line items administered by McDonnell are stored in
spaces made available by the Missile Center. The supply department
of the Naval Air Station only handles aircraft engines, some Govern-
ment Furnished Aeronautical Equipment and service changes for the
weapon
.
The major deficiency in material support occurred early in
the program when Government-Furnished support equipment arrived
several months after the aircraft. Otherwise the Contractor support
program is functioning very successfully and material problems are
minimal. All concerned consider the contractor support program as
a necessary way of life in order to keep these "peculiarly configured",
aircraft in top condition. The number of planes AOCP because of
supply support deficiencies has been negligible.
OTH I ,T3 OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
OF THE FAH-1
Though Type Commanders have retained responsibility for over-
all control and coordination of supply support of deploying squadrons
and carriers, the Contractor support concept has brought with it an-
other "first" with regard to the outfitting of carriers scheduled
to support the Fi+H. In the past, all repair parts were provided to
aircraft carriers from stocks at Navy supply activities on either
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coast. Further, the range and depth had been specified on the basis
of Bureau of Aeronautics Allowance Lists prepared by the Aviation
Supply Office. These Allowance Lists were still prepared and used
for the F4H but not in the same manner. Because of the "compressed"
nature of the FIRM Plan as related to spares provisioning and de-
liveries, as well as contractor experience during the test, develop-
ment and RCVC- training, it was decided that the contractor would
provide a hundred eighty day stock level of Contractor-Furnished
material direct to three aircraft carriers. This action was essen-
tially completed in april of 1962 about four months before the first
deployment. The Navy supply system is providing the balance of the
common and peculiar materials also predicated on Contractor-Navy
experience and on a one hundred ei lay stock level. This out-
fitting technique will be an interesting subject for further eval-
uation in light of innumerable studies made in the past on outfit-
tings and development of allowance lists.
A much broader and comprehensive concept of "Contractor Sup-
port" which was touched on earlier must be mentioned at this time.
This is the assignment of responsibility to the contractor for prep-
aration and updating of documentation prescribing procedures for
maintenance engineering analyses and identifying program life peri-
odic maintenance requirements for the weapon . Because the FAH was
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons, Military
Specification V,reapon System Periodic Maintenance Requirements ; Air
Craft , XFMPP-1A8, Revised 3 June 1961.
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the first weapon under Contractor support, this facet of the program
was not fully implemented and in many areas this program is still
developing. The present Navy philosophy in this area is that:
Under the current state of compressed aircraft design develop-
ment, it is imperative that vigorous maintenance engineering be
pursued during the design development and production phases to
a degree not heretofore experienced in the procurement of air-
craft. Well defined, justifiable, preplanned requirements for
both scheduled and anticipated unscheduled maintenance consis-
tent xvith the state of design must be identified and provided
to the aircraft operator in a simple form, capable of ready ad-
justment to accomodate changes to the aircraft design or im-
provements in maintenance practices.
5
The above encompasses the requirement that, where specified
in the contract, the Contractor will: identify and define items
having maintenance significance, determine at what level of mainten-
ance repairs can be performed, promulgate maintenance manuals and
squadron maintenance requirements cards, develop and specify compon-
ent replacement factors, etc.
From this brief resume it is obvious that if implemented in
breadth, logistic support responsibilities of contractors may be
ti .d to the weapon system as long as it remains in the fleet and
conversely the Navy may be tied to many contractors for weapons
system support procedures from the birth to the death of a weapon.
] lRY




Air Group and at a Fleet operational test and evaluation site, was
implemented with very few difficulties. The minor problems that did
occur appeared to be caused by the dichotomy of supply sources with
Government-Furnished Aeronautical material periodically not avail-
able to the Contractor in sufficient quantity. This pin pointing
of responsibility is understandable in light of the Contractor's
ability to obtain items from aircraft production lines. A basic
defect in the program appeared to be a lack of defirii~cive measures
of effectiveness. Other problems were the questionable validity of
usage data and minimal development of fleet repair capability under
SAR-398. Additional deficiencies were noted in the rather discon-
tinuous transition to Navy Supply support.
All of the above deficiencies are considered to be minor. In
consideration of weapon complexity, the achieved low AOCP rate for
the FAH, and previous experience in the introduction of fleet air-
craft, SAR-398 appeared to provide excellent results. One of the
most beneficial effects of the program was the emphasis derived for
a concentrated team effort by Wavy and Contractor personnel in order
to optimize aircraft availability in the early stages of fleet
operation.
Further ramifications of Contractor support beyond the scope
of this paper remain to be evaluated with regard to carrier out-
fittings and related allowance lists and documentation concerning





The United States Air Force in the past has considered and
rejected buying "management" of a weapons system. This rejection
was atributed to the costs inherent in such a program. However,
present Air Force policy on the use of "Contractor support" in a
narrower management sense is quite extensive, particularly, for
support functions classified by that Service as not being combat or
direct combat functions. Though the U3AF concept provides for ex-
tensive commercial aircraft overhaul and major rework capability, it
does not provide for the release to contractors of logistic functions
such as organic (fleet level) maintenance, engineering analyses and
supply for "vital" weapon systems such as the F-llCp (the Air Force
designation for the McDonnell F4H-1). In other words, the Air Force
will not use SAR-398 or atendant contractor support concepts. To
the contrary, the Air Force logistics requirements are to be provid-
ed in accordance with the following basic principles:
The USAF must be organically capable of managing the entire
logistic support program. To develop and maintain this capa-
bility, the Air Force must be able to approve, direct and control
1
Space Aeronautics Magazine, (March I960), p. 26,
2United States Air Force Regulation Number 25-6, Use of Contract
Services
, 5 October I960.
3United States Air Force Material Program Guidance P-64, Volume
1, Section 1, Chapter 1.
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the entire depot logistic program and must keep abreast of man-
agement and technological advances so that it can effectively,
and organically, manage new systems as they enter bhe inventory.
In addition, this capability must be established early in the
research and development stage of a new system to insure that
the Air Force is managerially capable of providing the logistic
support needed to fulfill the operational objectives of the
weapons system. 4-
le fact that the above policy exists for the Air Forces does
not imply that it is the only right policy for the Military Services,
Nevertheless, because of cost and other military management con-
siderations, it does indicate that the Air Force is not willing to
relinquish control over logistic support to the extent of the Navy's
action on the F4H-1 ana subsequent aircraft under SAR-39&. This is
paradoxical in part, for we in the Navy have always encouraged and
maintained an "in-service "capability for overhaul and major repairs
of weapons, a function the Air Force has delegated to industry. In
any event, our pursuit of contractor support has a precedent within
the Air Force which should be looked into before proceeding too far
down the road to increasing dependence on industry.
On the other hand, the Navy's willingness to experiment by
giving contractors a greater role in the introduction of new weapons
does have obvious advantages as already discussed. Further, the
Navy does not appear to be relinquishing too much control over




questions with regard to the development and promulgation of main-
tenance engineering standards and related documentation. For in-
stance, there are undoubtedly strong similarities between certain
maintenance functions of avery weapon. If the contractor actions
are not carefully coordinated and controlled we will develop a
Douglas way, a Grumman way, a McDonnell way, etc., to do the same
function.
The cost of the SAR-398 program with all its ramifications,
is unknown to the writer and perhaps not to anyone else. It is
known that costs have varied with the weapon and contractor and
there apparently is no distinct pattern on which to base future
cost trends. At this writing the provisions of contractor support
have been incorporated in contracts with four different contractors
for six different weapons. Since SAR-398 material at fleet sites
reverts to the ICavy supply system on transition to SAR-AOO, very
little of this material is considered to be in the nature of an
"excess" cost to the Navy. Material at test and evaluation sices
does provide some what of a different situation because it is not
available as a current asset for support of all fleet aircraft.
Rather, it is kept for the most part, in a separate contractor
supply system primarily for his use. However, even here, selected
items from these exclusive inventories could be made available for
fleet use in an emergency. There have been many discussions with
regard to the high "cost" of SAR-398 and attendant call contracts.
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It is believed that if costs incurred under contractor support are
higher than the previous introductory programs, said costs are only
being viewed in light of their effect on this year's budget. This
is indeed a short range view of costing, though admittedly, one we
have had to live with under past budgetary constraints. From a more
pragmatic point of view, and in light of current emphasis by the
Department of Defense on the mission oriented Program Package con-
cept for funding vfeapons, it seems to be essential that a detailed
economic analysis of contractor versus Navy support be conducted.
It is 6o recommended.
The contractor support concept was developed in an effort to
obviate logistic support deficiencies experienced heretofore in
connection with the introduction of highly complex weapons into the
fleet. It has been tailored to conform with the "weapon system
support concept" by melding contractor and government personnel into
a strong logistic team. It is a very complex support system invol-
ving coordination of countless personnel at all levels of govern-
ment and industry. Concrete measures of effectiveness are not
available to determine the efficacy of the system in relation to
dollar and time constraints. The program has been very successful
to date on the Fi+H-l, both in the Fleet Introduction in the RCVG
and in the fleet test and evaluation phases of the FIRM Plan. By
successful, it is meant that the AOCP rate has been low and aircraft
availability has been high. Unfortunately, measuring this low A
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rate and high aircraft availability against any previous weapon
introductory program cannot be done with much validity. The F4H-1
program was in a class by itself and subjected to individual em-
phasis by all concerned. Further, this aircraft benefited in many
areas other than contractor support from experience gained when the
Navy introduced its last new family of weapons in 1956 and 1957.
SAR-398 obviously is not a panacea for aviation logistic
ills, but as stated before, it certainly has resulted in optimizing
the efforts of all concerned in coordinating support of a weapon.
In total, it appears that support of the FI+H-1 under SA
-J 98 cannot
be criticized other than constructively. And even then, not in
depth. In this vein, if cost considerations allow the program to
continue, it is suggested that only one major improvement be under-
taken in the program. This is in the area of greater integration
of Navy supply personnel in the initial phases of weapon support.
More specifically, in lieu of assigning supply support functions for
the new weapon strictly to contractor personnel, assign these duties
from the beginning of the -98 program to a specially created
supply task force ol L'avy personnel. The task force to be headed
by a junior Supply Corps officer or an E-9, Chief Aviation Store-
keeper. The task force would be assisted by one contractor parts
representative, it ould follow procedures specified by contractor
supply organization and during the tenure of contractor support
would report to a designated weapon project officer either in the
37

7G or in the Air Development Squadron. At such time as support is
transitioned to the Navy under - 00 the task force would report
to the station Supply Officer. Aside from local inventory manag
ment functions this task force leader could represent, and be fully
cognizant of, Bureau of i /iation Supply Office inte-
rests of SAR-3 98/400 polcies and procedures.
In the area of minor suggestions, it is believed ;re
is a need for a general increase in Navy efforts to repair components
locally. Local Navy efforts could also be effec
,
used in
scrutinizing the generation and reporting of usage dat .
From the above it can be seen that there are few, if any,
basic differences of opinion with respect to the resent concepts
of operation under -- . ather, it is believ .t a tighten-
ing up of Navy/Contractor integration with more emphasis on Navy
supply control and participation in the early stages is all that is
necessary. Through the above actions, coupled with more stringent
guidance over Navy Personnel, it is believed that greater emphasis
on Navy maintenance and repair of components can de derived in the
field. Further it is considered that the use of Navy personnel in
the control of supply functions, with privileges of material access
now enjoyed by contractor supply representatives could possibly
save funds, provide more Navy experience early in the program, fa-
cilitate transition t< ort, and provide a more realistic
appraisal of usage data generated.
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As a final recommendation it is considered necessary that
future studies be conducted with regard to the efficacy of outfitt-
ing procedures of aircraft carriers described in Chapter 3 and also
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